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overall educational value of the book since many points of debate
about correctional reform are discussed through Mr. Oswald's review of
his career. The author tries to make the case that he was as qualified to
handle the Attica situation as anyone, and, though he is at times a little
over-anxious to do so, he is not overbearing in his manner and is
generally successful in his purpose.
Society must find the best ways to deal with one of its most pressing
problems: criminal justice, a complex situation that goes far beyond
the overcrowded prisons, a major focus of this book. We cannot
understand the field of corrections, however, without knowing as much
as possible about its various components. Russell G. Oswald's personal
experiences provide a valuable means to gain useful insight into the
overall situation of criminal justice as it related to penology. It is well
worth reading.
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, CASES AND MATERIALS. By R. H.
Maudsley and E. H. Burn. London: Butterworth and Company. 1972.
Pp. 660. $11.00. Professor Maudsley is Professor of Law at Kings
College, University of London. His specialties are Equity, Trusts and
Estates, Land Law, Estate Planning and related subjects. Mr. Burn is a
lecturer in the Law of Land in the Inns of Court. Reviewed by Harold
D. Cunningham, Jr.*
Ever since Langdell developed his celebrated "case method" at
Harvard over one hundred years ago, the principal teaching tool in use
in American law schools has been the "casebook." Langdell would
hardly recognize contemporary American casebooks, but they still
retain their original character as tools for the Socratic technique of
probing inquiry. These case holdings are not set forth in black-letter
fashion: the student is expected to dig out the legal principles on his
own. In contrast to the American "casebook," casebooks in Britain
have traditionally not been designed to be the student's primary study
tool. Casebooks have been used there for some time, but not as widely
as in the United States, and their thrust and structure have been
different from their American counterparts. The fact that lectures,
rather than "classes" or seminars, have provided the dominant law
teaching milieu at British Universities, plus the fact that British law
students, be they reading English or Scots law, generally have only one
jurisdiction to worry about, has tended to make the approach of British
casebook authors more didactic. Their authors have been less tempted
to pose a problem and leave it for the student to figure out. Instead
they have "laid it out" in a manner unfamiliar to (but perhaps
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.
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sometimes desired by) American students. For example, in Winfield's
celebrated little casebook,' each case selection is prefaced by a
statement of the applicable rule. Thus, the case is there to illustrate the
author's formulation of the rule and not as a vehicle for its deduction
by the student.
The foregoing excursus has been necessary to'provide a backdrop for
a consideration of an English casebook which in this reviewer's opinion
goes far toward successfully bridging the gap between the two methods
of law teaching. Like other English casebooks, it is not designed as the
primary vehicle of instruction. Students attending Professor Maudsley's
lectures at Kings College, London, or Mr. Burn's lectures in the Inns of
Court, will still be expected to have read one or more of the standard
texts.2
On the other hand, the case and cognate material the authors set
forth is not intended to illustrate previously posited black letter rules.
Although (in keeping with the English practice) the reader is usually
informed of the holding of the case at the outset, sources and
explanatory comments are woven together in a format that requires the
student to synthesize his own body of principles. On the other hand, in
the fashion of an American casebook, there are questions and problems
and copious references to collateral readings after each group of cases
and materials, thus emphasizing the book's utility as a classroom tool.
The authors have been successful collaborators in the field of Equity
and Property and are adept at casebook preparation. 3 In Professor
Maudsley's case, his experience with the case method goes back at least
to 1949. In that year, he and Professor Hanbury4 (then on the eve of
his election to the Vinerian chair of English Law at Oxford)
inaugurated a "class" or seminar-type meeting in which leading cases in
the field of Equity and Trusts were discussed in a fashion very much
like that found in American law schools. Professor Maudsley has also
had extensive experience as a student and teacher in American law
schools.'
The casebook under review understandably tracks very closely
Professor Maudsley's edition of Hanbury's Modern Equity; but the
1. P. WINFIELD, CASES ON THE LAW OF TORT (4th ed. 1948).
2. E.g., H. HANBURY, MODERN EQUITY (9th ed. R. Maudsley 1969); P. PETTIT, EQUITY AND
THE LAW OF TRUSTS (1966); D. PARKER & A. MELLOWS, THE MODERN LAW OF TRUSTS
(1966); and E. SNELL, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY (25th ed. R. Megarry & P. Baker 1960).
3. Professor Maudsley, formerly a fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford, acknowledged his
debt to Mr. Burn, his former Oxford colleague in the preface to the ninth edition of Han-
bury's Modern Equity, which Professor Maudsley edited in 1969. Together they wrote R.
MAUDSLEY & E. BURN, LAND LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1970).
4. Professor Hanbury was my tutor at Lincoln College, Oxford when I began my studies there
in 1949. This seminar not only marked the beginning of my long friendship with Professor
Maudsley, it also proved to be one of the high points of my Oxford experience.
5. As a Commonwealth Fellow at Harvard, he earned an S.J.D. He has held visiting law pro-
fessorships at the Universities of Chicago, Cornell, Miami and San Diego. He has also lec-
tured at the University of Baltimore and at Cornell.
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nature of the subject favors compatibility between casebook and
textbook treatment of a given topic. Many of the issues have been
carefully honed by numerous precedents and subjected to critical
scrutiny by teachers and practitioners. Thus the very need to respond
to criticism tends to perpetuate a format and approach to the problem
under discussion compatible with other current works on the subject.
Turning now to substance, how is the material of the subject
presented? The development of the topics discussed is straight-forward
without being stereotyped or pedantic. After a lucid introductory
section, an approach to a definition of a Trust is suggested. This is done
by way of extracts from Maitland, Underhill, Scott, and finally
Hanbury.6 Particularly useful to American law teachers and students is
the account that follows in which the trust is distinguished from other
relationships such as bailment, agency, contract, debt, third party
beneficiary relations, conditions, equitable charges, powers and other
relations.7 Chapter 2, "The Requirements of a Trust," covers the
formalities by setting forth pertinent statutory provisions dealing with
the requirement of a writing, and develops the problem of certainty by
the insertion of case material, in particular, the recent case of McPhail
v. Doulton.8  The special problems pertinent to unincorporated
associations are also noted.9
Chapter 3 deals with volunteers and other aspects of the constitution
of trusts, including trusts involving property to be acquired in the
future. Chapter 4 covers, inter alia, topics frequently stressed in
American casebooks on Wills and Trusts, such as incorporation by
reference, facts of independent legal significance and secret trusts. The
doctrine of facts of independent legal significance is succinctly
presented via a brief extract from Scott on Trusts. 1 0 The Uniform
Testamentary Additions to Trusts Act is also quoted.' ' Except for a
single case, 2 some explanatory comment (incorporating an extract
from Hanbury" 3) and the proceedings of the Conference on Uniform
Legislation in Canada (1965-1968),' this is all the authors say directly
about incorporation by reference, facts of independent legal signifi-
cance and gifts to trustees of an existing settlement.
American readers who have been teased by the cryptic references to
English cases on these topics in casebooks such as Leach on Wills and
Scott on Trusts may be disappointed that the authors did not choose
6. R. MAUDSLEY & E. BURN, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES, CASES AND MATERIALS, 4-6 (1972) [herein-
after cited as MAUDSLEY & BURN].
7. Id. 6-30.
8. [1971] A.C. 424; MAUDSLEY & BURN 44-55.
9. MAUDSLEY & BURN 55-72.
10. A. Scorr, LAW OF TRUSTS § 54.2 (3rd ed. 1967); MAUDSLEY & BURN 111.
11. MAUDSLEY & BURN 117.
12. In the Goods of Smart, [19021 P. 238; MAUDSLEY & BURN 109.
13. HANBURY, supra note 2, 158-160; MAUDSLEY & BURN 113.
14. MAUDSLEY & BURN 115-117.
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to include more case material on these points. The section on Secret
Trusts' I does, however, contain extracts from the leading cases,' 6 and
comments or footnote references to many others.
Ever since the case of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 1 7 courts have
been plagued by the problem of how to treat the gifts of donors whose
donative acts did not fit into the category of charitable dispositions but
who clearly did not make the usual private gift. The problem has not
disappeared, and the usual result has been to enforce such "trusts" if
they can be construed as "certain," and for the benefit of individuals
rather than for "purposes or objects."' s The authors have provided a
balanced treatment of this topic in Chapter 5, in which the anomalous
animal and monument cases and the perpetuities aspects of the problem
are well covered.' 9
Law students are frequently confused by the somewhat schizoid
manner in which the law uses the trust as an intent-enforcing, as well as
a remedial, mechanism. Although there may be some conceptual
problems,2 0 the cause of the difficulty is possibly the loose manner in
which courts have used the adjectives, "constructive" and "resulting,"
in connection with the word "trust." Professor Maudsley and Mr. Burn
are clearly right when they assert that in some cases these adjectival
designations make little difference from the viewpoint of the applicable
legal consequences. 2'
In the main, however, the authors follow the orthodox approach and
treat the resulting trust in Chapter 6 as a partly remedial and partly
intent-enforcing device influenced by a number of presumptions that
are brought into play to cope with the situation of a failure of an
express trust. The constructive trust, discussion of which is deferred
until Chapter 9, is clearly and accurately distinguished from a resulting
trust. While each can be said in a sense to be a trust arising by operation
of law, the guiding principle of constructive trusts is unjust enrichment,
rather than failure to comply with formalities.
The American reader will probably be most interested in Chapter 7
(Trusts and Creditors) and Chapter 8 (Tax Saving Trusts) from the
viewpoint of comparative law. English law does not recognize
spend-thrift trusts, but the gap is almost entirely filled by varieties of
protective trusts.2 2
15. Id. 118-134.
16. McCormack v. Grogan, L.R. 4 H.L. 82 (1869); MAUDSLEY & BURN 119; Blackwell v. Black-
well, [1929] A.C. 318; MAUDSLEY & BURN 123; Re Keen, [1937] Ch. 236, 1 All E.R. 452
(1937); MAUDSLEY & BURN 126.
17. 9 Ves. 399 (1804), affd, 10 Ves. 522 (1805).
18. Re Denley's Trust Deed, [1969] 1 Ch. 373, 3 All E.R. 65 (1968); MAUDSLEY & BURN 137.
19. MAUDSLEY & BURN 156-158.
20. See A. GULLIVER, E. CLARK, L. LUSKY & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 411 (1967).
21. MAUDSLEY & BURN 160.
22. A. Scorr, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 282 (1960); MAUDSLEY & BURN 200. The
English student reader is referred to American sources at p. 213 and asked if he would
favor the introduction of Spendthrift Trusts in England.
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The impact of the tax collector on the trust device (Chapter 8) is
covered with technical precision. American readers versed in estate
planning will doubtless be pleased to learn that the subject is no less
complicated in England than it is here.2 3
The Trust portion of the book is concluded by three lengthy
chapters on the subject of charities. Although the Charities Act of
196024 -has made some substantial changes, American readers will feel
at home with the author's treatment of charities, cy pres, and the
problems of the administration of charities.
Part III of the casebook deals with Trustees. Here again there is much
that is familiar to American readers, however, a caveat is necessary. The
applicable rules and principles wear common law garb but there have
been many statutory changes, the most important of which was the
Trustee Act of 1925.2 s Thus, the materials in Chapter 13 (General
Principles Relating to Trustees), Chapter 14 (Duties of Trustees),
Chapter 15 (Powers of Trustees), Chapter 16 (Variation of Trusts),
Chapter 17 (Fiduciary Position of Trustees), and Chapter 18 (Breach of
Trusts) must be read carefully with an eye to the special English
statutory experience. Some noteworthy cases are quoted with reference
to problems that may today defy solution in any jurisdiction,2 6 and
which come up again and again. 2 7 The last case in the book is the
celebrated Re Diplock2 8 which applied the doctrine of tracing to
permit next of kin to recover in part monies paid to the beneficiaries of
a trust subsequently declared void.
So much for a sketch of content, now for an assessment: from the
viewpoint of scholarship, I cannot fault the authors' effort. The
casebook is a teaching tool, not a thesis, and thus, it is not the most
appropriate vehicle for the defense of doctrinal points. I noticed no
errors of commission, and what I might proffer as an error of
omission, someone else might regard as a badge of excellence.
It is better then, to assess the book's utility for both British and
American readers. As for the former, it is of course a "must" at the
academic level for both students and teachers. English practitioners
nurtured on the older textbooks and desiring a convenient collection of
23. Professor Maudsley has summarized this topic for American readers in his article, "Tax
Planning in England," 9 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 264 (1972); MAUDSLEY & BURN 227.
24. 8 & 9 Eliz. 2, c. 58 (1960). Section 13 of this act changed the rules relating to Cy Pres. The
statute generally gave more control and supervision of the administration of charities to
charity commissioners and less to the courts; MAUDSLEY & BURN 391.
25. 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 19 (1925); MAUDSLEY & BURN 425.
26. Re Beloved Wilkes's Charity, 3 Mac. & G. 440 (1957); MAUDSLEY & BURN 458. Cf. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
27. Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 3 All E.R. 721 (1966); MAUDSLEY & BURN 602 (in-
volving the duty of fiduciaries to account for profits acquired from their office); Bahnin v.
Hughes, 31 Ch. D. 390 (1886); MAUDSLEY & BURN 618 (joint and several liability of trustees);
Re Hallett's Estate, 13 Ch. D. 696 (1880); MAUDSLEY & BURN 637 (tracing funds converted
by trustee).
28. [1948] Ch. 465, 2 All E.R. 318 (1948); MAUDSLEY & BURN 644.
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case materials would doubtless find the book well worth the
investment. On the American side, the book's reading public is
obviously much more limited. Every law school library should have a
copy to place alongside Hanbury's Modern Equity and Lewin on Trusts,
or similar English works. American professors of Trusts and Estates will
find its coverage of familiar subjects clear and refreshing. More often
than not, unfamiliar areas will be worth dipping into for insights that
can be passed along to students. Finally, American law students trying
to understand basic concepts or reviewing for exams will profit from
the time spent in browsing through the pages of the book.
To return now to the pedagogical theme posited at the outset of this
review, Trusts & Estates, Cases & Materials, by Maudsley and Burn,
richly deserves a place among the category of "course-books" on the
law. It is not intended to do the job of an American casebook but it
will do much to give English readers a feel for the case method.
Conversely, for American readers it shows the English case and
statutory materials as products of a living system and not simply as
examples of what used to be "at common law" or "in equity" in
England.
HOW TO PROVE DAMAGES IN WRONGFUL PERSONAL INJURY
AND DEATH CASES. By I. Duke Avnet, Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1973. Pp. 280. $16.00. Mr. Avnet received
his A.B. and J.D. from New York University in 1932, and is now
practicing law in Baltimore, Maryland. Reviewed by Eugene J.
Davidson.*
It is not uncommon to hear of large dollar negligence verdicts where
the liability was somewhat dubious and the injuries were less than
substantial, and of minimal verdicts where both liability and substantial
injuries seemingly were clear. Indeed this reviewer can recall an instance
in which two suits arising from the same accident were tried on the
same day by different counsel. One verdict was almost four times as
great as the other, although the difference in the injuries was not that
significant. The logical question is why? Was it because of the trial
judge? Jury composition? Defense counsel? Plaintiff's mannerisms?
None of these factors could be said to account for the disparity in the
verdicts, as the judge in each case was equally accustomed to negligence
litigation, the jurors came from the same panel, defense counsel were
from the same insurance carrier's stable of trial counsel, and there was
no ostensible difference in the conduct or appearance of the plaintiffs.
There was, however, a clear distinction in the trial strategy of plaintiff's
* Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
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